

VZCZCXRO8136
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0170/01 0361522
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051522Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6007
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000170

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2017

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [AU](#) [SU](#) [CD](#)

SUBJECT: DARFUR: STATUS OF THE NON-SIGNATORIES

REF: KHARTOUM 00155

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) Summary: The conference of Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory commanders has again been delayed to allow time for more commanders to assemble in North Darfur. A variety of Embassy contacts report that efforts to unify the commanders, facilitate negotiation within the framework of the DPA, and advance the political process in Darfur have been obstructed by the competing interests of some non-signatory leaders, neighboring governments, and the regime in Khartoum. Rebel leaders and commanders continue to jostle for position, Chad continues to influence the internal power struggles of the rebel movements, and the Sudanese government continues to manipulate individual non-signatories. Meanwhile, Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) leaders have offered to take a more active role in reconciling the Sudanese and Chadian governments and bringing the non-signatories to political dialogue, but have asked for high-level USG assistance in facilitating both. End summary.

Non-Signatories Conference

12. (C) The opening of the conference of DPA non-signatory commanders in North Darfur has been postponed until at least February 9 to allow more time for some faction commanders to reach the event site. At present, commanders representing many of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions have arrived in North Darfur. We continue to encourage the factions to announce their intention to unite in order to engage in peaceful dialogue with the Sudanese government within the framework of the DPA. Many commanders have expressed frustration at their current political leadership, and a variety of reports suggest that the commanders are engaged in discussions to restructure the movement and nominate individuals to leadership positions. However, internal bickering and power struggles make it difficult to predict the outcome of the event should it begin.

Chadian Role

13. (C) As reported reftel, Embassy contacts indicate that the leaders of the factions that comprised the National Redemption Front (NRF) continue to meet along the Chad-Sudan border and have the greatest access to resources of any rebels, courtesy of the Chadian government. This group, including the leaders of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) faction aligned with Adam Ali Shoggar, and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance

(SFDA) led by Sharif Harir and Ahmed Diraig, are attempting to revitalize the NRF. Signals are mixed as to whether any elements of this group or SLA/G-19 commander Adam Bakhit -- who commands the largest number of fighters and has clear ties to the Chadian government -- intend to participate in the conference in North Darfur or instead pursue a policy of regime change in Khartoum with Chadian backing.

Sudan Making Separate Peaces

14. (C) The Sudanese government continues to make individual bargains with DPA non-signatory leaders outside the DPA framework. On January 4, the Presidency announced the appointments of Declaration of Commitment (DOC) signatories Abdelrahman Musa and Ibrahim Madibbo as state minister of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the Darfur Resettlement and Rehabilitation Commission, respectively. In addition, the Sudanese government appointed 12 Darfurian members to the Sudanese parliament. These decisions were made without the concurrence of Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi and may alienate some non-signatory groups by limiting the positions now available to them should they join the DPA. Reports also indicate that DOC signatory Abdulgassim Imam was appointed governor of West Darfur, and in recent days, he has cooperated with Government forces to "box-in" areas controlled by commanders allied with Abdel Wahid al-Nur in an attempt to assume the leadership of the Fur.

SPLM Assists in Diffusing Conflict?

KHARTOUM 00000170 002 OF 002

15. (C) In a February 4 meeting with USAID Mission Director and Poloff, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amun and SPLM Deputy Secretary General for the Northern Sector Yassir Arman

SIPDIS

expressed an interest in working with the Chadian and Sudanese governments to diffuse bilateral tensions and in organizing a conference in Yei for non-signatory political leaders to facilitate a common negotiating position. This follows First Vice President Salva Kiir's announcement on February 4 that he planned to travel to Darfur in the near future. Arman proposed that Kiir could also serve as an emissary to Chadian President Idriss Deby based on SPLM connections from the past, while the Yei conference would lay the groundwork for the broader UN/AU political process stipulated in the November Addis Ababa agreement. Arman said that he had spoken with Abdel Wahid, SLA leader Ahmed Abdul Shafi, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, and Minawi in recent weeks, all of whom were open to an SPLM-sponsored dialogue. (Note: SFDA leaders Harir and Diraig would also be included in the Yei conference. End note.) He requested USG assistance in re-establishing a direct link with President Deby in Ndjamena and recommended that either A/S Frazer or S/E Natsios speak to Kiir on the SPLM's role vis-a-vis the non-signatories.

Comment

16. (C) The absence of clear signals from the non-signatories in Chad and in North Darfur on whether they intend to unify in support of constructive political dialogue suggests that the SPLM initiative is worth considering. If the SPLM could succeed in lessening the tensions between the Chadian and Sudanese governments, this may decrease Chad's intervention in the Darfur conflict. Similarly, the SPLM's successful engagement with non-signatory political leaders might lessen their manipulation of commanders on the ground. Despite the SPLM's renewed interest in diffusing the Darfur crisis, it

remains to be seen how much political capital Kiir will
expend to that end. End comment.
POWERS